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From War Grave to Peace Garden: Muslim Soldiers, Militarized Multiculture and 
Cultural Heritage 
 
Abstract: The focus of this article is the renovation and rededication of a WW1 cemetery 
designated for Indian Muslim soldiers, located in Woking, Surrey. The close involvement 
of the British Army in this project is examined as an instance of militarized multiculture. 
The centenary of WW1 provides the wider context for exploring the category of ‘the 
Muslim soldier’. The essay discusses the significance of military service for UK 
postcolonial citizens, whether in terms of advancing claims to belong to British historical 
narratives or in asserting the right to join the contemporary armed forces, as evidenced by 
the Armed Forces Muslim Association. In addition, the Islamic peace garden project 
illustrates the importance of community place-making initiatives for integrating minority 
cultural heritage into mainstream narratives.   
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Introduction 
In November 2015 a former WW1 burial ground for Indian Muslim soldiers who died in 
England was re-opened as a memorial garden dedicated to peace. Almost a century 
earlier, the same site in Woking, Surrey, had been chosen as a dedicated cemetery for 
Indian soldiers who had died after being treated in the temporary military hospitals set up 
along the south coast. But this was not to be their final resting place. In 1969 the graves – 
by then 27 in number – were relocated to Brookwood Cemetery nearby and the walled 
grounds returned to the care of the Horsell Common Preservation Society. Today, thanks 
partly to the efforts of Historic England (HE, formerly part of English Heritage), together 
with funding from Woking Borough Council and other partners such as the Ministry of 
Defence (MoD), the Sultanate of Oman and the local mosque, the ruins of the former 
cemetery were brought back to life as an enclosed garden, reconfigured and planted 
according to Islamic design principles, and dedicated to the memory of the servicemen 
once buried there. Throughout this process of renovation, senior officers of the British 
Army and members of the Armed Forces Muslim Association (AFMA) were active in 
promoting the project as well as providing practical support.  
 
The various phases of restoration were reported in the local media with staged 
photographs featuring an array of interested parties, including high-ranking military 
personnel. In August 2013, for example, the start of the work was marked by a prayer 
ceremony, led by the Imam Asim Hafiz, formerly Muslim chaplain to the armed forces 
and now Defence Islamic adviser, and Reverend Ian Brackley, the Suffragan Bishop of 
Dorking. The occasion was also reported by the Ministry of Defence which published a 
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news item on their website. The launch of the second phase in December 2014 also saw a 
prayer ceremony, led by Imam Dr Syed Naqvi, who represented Woking’s Muslim 
community, and the Assistant Chaplin from the Royal Military Academy in Sandhurst. 
On this occasion, the event was attended by the Under Secretary of State for 
Communities and Local Government, Stephen Williams MP, who was reported as saying 
that the Peace Garden ‘will allow this community to reflect on the sacrifice of so many 
during the First World War and to remember the brave men who came from across the 
world to fight for our freedom’.1 In a separate statement, the Secretary of State for 
Culture, Sajid Javid, said that the restoration of the Muslim Burial Ground was 
particularly poignant in the centennial year, adding that the site was ‘a symbol of those 
lost, and an early and important part of British Muslim history’.2  
 
This endorsement was evidence that the restoration presented the government with a 
significant opportunity to assert a meaningful historical connection between those 
military recruits from undivided India, many of whom had been landless peasants before 
enlisting, and a new generation of UK-born citizens of Muslim faith and heritage.  The 
message was reinforced by another dignitary at the event, Major General Stuart Skeates, 
who declared he was proud to represent both the British Army and the Royal Military 
Academy, Sandhurst. He made a point of claiming that both institutions had connections 
with the British Muslim community over the course of many years: 
 
The British Muslim community has a great heritage of military service and many 
have made the ultimate sacrifice to ensure that we can live in peace and prosperity. 
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The restoration of this historic site and the creation of a Peace Garden is a 
wonderful symbol of the bond between the military and Muslim communities and 
serves as a tribute to those young men and women of all our communities who have 
gone before us and died in the service of their country.⁠3 
 
The strategic value of the collaboration was also highlighted by Historic England (HE), 
which provided the bulk of the funding for this project. HE made it clear from the start 
that the site would be a joint initiative with the Ministry of Defence, explaining that it 
would be ‘an integral part of the Armed Forces’ ongoing cultural diversity training and 
annual memorial services for the local community and forces’.4 As a way of underlining 
the value of local military history as a resource for younger generations, students from a 
local school joined serving soldiers, including members of the Armed Forces Muslim 
Association (AFMA), and Imam Hashmi from Woking’s Shah Jahan Mosque, to plant the 
27th and final silver birch tree shortly before the opening ceremony the following year.5 
The garden, which features a water fountain incorporating a memorial stone inscribed 
with the names of the Indian soldiers, was then given the royal seal of approval when it 
was officially opened by the Earl of Wessex on 12 November 2015. Finally, the three-
year process of restoration was captured by a BBC documentary broadcast in January 
2016. Aaqil Ahmed, the BBC's head of religion and ethics, reportedly explained that he 
commissioned the film after seeing the burial ground in its relatively abandoned state and 
realizing that it was ‘a forgotten part of British history and a story worth telling’.6 
 
It is perhaps inevitable that military service in the cause of defending Britain’s interests in 
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the past remains an important qualification for enacting modern claims to citizenship and 
defining the bounds of the political, national and postcolonial community (Paul 1998, 
Ware 2010). However, in an effort to unpick the different elements involved in the 
reconstruction of this extraordinary site, it is necessary to focus on the contemporary 
‘Muslim soldier’, a complex figure which has largely escaped the attention of those who 
study the ‘integrated culture of militarism’ in the UK (Rogers 2017, p.198). The AFMA, 
which represents and provides a voice for Muslims inside the institution, has been pivotal 
in this episode of historic restoration and claim-making. On the one hand, the project has 
been represented as a largely Muslim-led initiative, demonstrating the agency of the loyal 
Muslim citizen-soldier who is thoroughly, and historically, integrated into the UK 
national narrative. On the other, the close involvement of the armed forces in this high-
profile renovation project has allowed the institution to showcase the ongoing 
participation of Muslim personnel serving in the armed forces today (Ware 2013). At a 
time when Muslim citizens throughout Europe are being stigmatized as disloyal subjects 
who pose a potential threat to national security (Qureshi and Zeitlyn 2013), the 
reclamation of the burial ground as a space dedicated to peace demonstrates how the 
cultural heritage of colonial war can be instrumental in countering anti-Muslim or racist 
discourse. By asking whose interests are served by the militarization of cultural heritage 
in Britain, the essay will hopefully contribute to a growing body of critical work on the 
salience of war, history and memory for the politics of race and citizenship today. 
 
Militarised multiculture 
The restoration of any historic ruin is necessarily a complex task, not unlike the 
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painstaking physical labour entailed in archaeological research. There are long lost 
fragments to be excavated, identified and assessed in the light of present knowledge, and 
new perspectives on the past to be developed and tested against existing evidence. This 
site in southern, suburban England is no different. To do justice to its full significance is 
to bring together many seemingly disparate issues: the centennial commemorations of 
WW1 taking place on national and local scales; the contested politics of race and colonial 
war heritage; the hardening of collective identities defined along lines of faith as well as 
ethnicity and culture; the importance of military labour – and particularly death in service 
– in grounding minority claims to belong as well as to qualify as loyal citizens; the 
richness of local histories long buried or suppressed; the contingencies of military 
recruitment crises; and the wider context of endless war accompanied by the tightening 
grip of securitization aimed primarily at Muslim communities, not just in British towns 
and cities but across Europe and the Anglophone world. The thread that I will use to 
connect these different strands of inquiry is the concept of militarized multiculture, a 
phenomenon that has helped to reposition the armed forces within civil society within the 
past decade. 
 
As I have argued in Military Migrants (2012) the concept of militarized multiculture 
provides a way of encapsulating the connections between the management of diversity 
within British military institutions and the extraordinary shifts in public attitudes to the 
UK armed forces that have taken place as a result of wars in Iraq and Afghanistan (Dixon 
2012; Gee 2014). The British Army accepted relatively late and rather reluctantly (Frost 
2002) that cultural diversity might have value as an institutional tool. The tortuous 
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process of reform entailed in reaching this conclusion was to some extent mandated by 
law, particularly after the Macpherson Report (1999) established the urgency of 
addressing institutional racism within the public sector7. Within scarcely more than a 
decade, the armed forces reached a position where they could justifiably claim to be a 
multicultural employer with a workforce – in the army at least – that approximately 
reflected the level of the Black, Asian and minority ethnic population (BAME) in the 
UK.8 This was achieved partly as a result of the imposition of equality and diversity 
legislation (Mason and Dandeker 2009; Forster 2012) and the threat of legal action in 
cases of discrimination, bullying or other forms of harassment (Basham 2009, 2013). The 
strategy that proved most effective in raising the numbers of BAME recruits was the 
temporary waiving of the residency requirement for Commonwealth citizens (Ware 
2012).9 But in addition to the formal recognition of the need to diversify the workforce in 
terms of colour, ethnicity, gender, sexuality and faith, the institution also discovered, 
albeit intermittently, that there were advantages in showing a more acceptable face to the 
public. In short, the visible embrace of diversity was integral to the process of 
modernization, as a result of which the armed forces could assert themselves as a 
dynamic and modern employer, equipped to meet the challenges of the 21st century 
despite public reservations about the wars that they were engaged in (British Social 
Attitudes 2012).  
 
There are three reasons why this claim is important to the argument in this essay: first, the 
representation of the army as a caring and visibly multiethnic employer is a key factor in 
attempts to attract desperately needed BAME recruits, not least because the proportion of 
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minorities within the target age range of 18-25 is due to rise exponentially. Following the 
much vaunted restructuring of the armed forces following the 2010 Strategic Defence 
Review, recruitment figures have been falling10 despite new advertising pitches that stress 
the positive benefits of joining for young people (Farmer 2017). Second, the enthusiastic 
self-promotion of the AFMA through social media is evidence of an employer that 
recognises the right of faith groups to represent and develop their distinct identities inside 
and outside the organisation. The support given by military officials to a community-
based renovation project might therefore indicate that the armed forces have embraced a 
new-found remit to engage with civil society as a key strategy in developing better links 
with hard-to-reach communities, such as Muslims. Third, in the context of war heritage 
and national identity, and specifically the centenary of 1914-1918, the government has 
been eager to promote the idea that, by bringing together people of diverse cultures, 
languages and faiths, cultural diversity could be celebrated as a global project with 
British military origins.  
 
This last point can be illustrated by the launch of an educational initiative to celebrate the 
‘Commonwealth Contribution’ to British victory in WW1. Entitled ‘Our Shared Past, Our 
Common Future,’ the project was inaugurated in November 2013 at the offices of the 
Royal United Services (RUSI) Institute in Whitehall, in the company of a large audience 
of invited guests, including Imam Asim Hafiz, members of the AFMA including the 
current Muslim chaplain to the armed forces, and General Sir David Richards, former 
Chief of the Defence Staff and patron of AFMA from its inception.1 The programme was 
to be delivered by a small organisation called the Curzon Institute which was being 
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funded to provide an educational package for schools across the UK. One of its 
spokesmen was ex-army officer Afzal Amin, a founding member of AFMA who was by 
then the Tory parliamentary candidate in Dudley. The initiative was endorsed by the 
prime minister through a pre-recorded video in which David Cameron claimed that 
British and colonial troops ‘fought together … fell together and together they defended 
the freedoms that we enjoy today’⁠ (Commonwealth Contribution 2013). 
 
Baroness Sayeeda Warsi, at that time a member of Cameron’s cabinet, chaired the 
session, expressing unreserved vocal support of the Curzon Institute and their mission to 
educate. Her welcoming address articulated the mood of the occasion (Warsi 2013):  
 
In his speech ‘A Time of Triumph’, Winston Churchill praised those who came 
“from the uttermost ends of the earth” to fight alongside Britain in the Second 
World War. “From the poorest colony to the most powerful dominion”, he said, “the 
great maxim held: when the King declares war, the Empire is at war”. 
 
Warsi declared her own interest in this initiative by adding that both of her grandfathers 
were ‘among those brave men’. But while she had known through her family history that 
many Indians fought for Britain in WW2, she was unaware of ‘the 1,500,000 from 
modern day India, Pakistan and Bangladesh who served, fought and fell for Britain in the 
Great War’. This history had been overlooked for far too long, she insisted, ‘like a 
chapter torn from the book of our history’ (2013).  
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However, this intervention was not simply aimed at replacing the deleted pages; there 
were also political reasons why the act of restoring this history to young British citizens 
was so timely. By using the phrase, ‘Tommies, Tariqs and Tajinders’, Warsi effectively 
sought to bind the scattered stories of heroism during the course of a brutal global war 
into an inclusive narrative about contemporary national identity in Britain. The range of 
different languages and scripts in which the names of the dead were inscribed on 
gravestones in Belgium and France echoed Cameron’s message that diversity was the 
starkest reminder that ‘comradeship, companionship and co-existence cut cross all faiths’. 
Through the recognition that these stories of heroism were multi-ethnic and multi-faith, 
she argued, the descendants of those soldiers would be able to ‘reclaim our proud, 
patriotic history’, proving that ‘this wasn’t the all-white war’ that many believed it was. 
By silencing their critics, they would also be able to ‘wrestle the Union Jack from the 
hands of the far right’, including ‘the ignorant people like Anjem Choudary and his 
followers’ (Warsi 2013).  
 
Warsi’s evocation of Choudary11 illustrated how the government’s security agenda was 
able to endorse diversity not just as a public good but also as an antidote to radicalisation. 
The coalition government, led by a Tory prime minister, was acknowledged to be the 
driver of this initiative to educate a new generation of young British citizens about their 
rightful claims to a military heritage that had been denied to them, not by the willful 
neglect of this topic in the national curriculum, but by the actions of ‘the far right’. 
Particularly striking was the forthright language used to praise the virtues of multi-ethnic, 
multi-faith cohesiveness made possible in war, an emphasis that felt at odds with 
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Cameron’s previous pronouncements on the failures of multiculturalism in Britain (Klug 
2015). 
 
In his carefully tailored speech screened at the start of the launch event, Cameron invited 
his audience to view the centenary of the 1914-1918 war as a chance to ‘come together to 
understand, not the only the scale of the sacrifice, but also the individual stories behind 
the statistics…stories that show you the strength of the bond between soldiers of all 
faiths, colours and races’ (Commonwealth Contribution 2013). This emphasis gave added 
weight to the domestic mission to persuade the British-born descendants of those soldiers 
that military service belonged to an honourable family tradition and was part of their 
blood heritage, regardless of faith or ethnic origin. It was also intended to boost Britain’s 
status as a global power by reminding Commonwealth countries that their experience of 
fighting in the British Expeditionary Force in WW1 was proof of shared suffering and 
sacrifice in a very different world (Ware 2014, p. xxx; British Future 2012). Thus the 
familiar message that the carnage of 20
th
 century warfare could be recuperated as a 
fundamentally noble endeavor was repeated through many channels, from the politics of 
identity at home to the practice of cultural diplomacy on an international level. However, 
it would be a mistake to see the launch of the Curzon Institute’s educational programme 
outside the context of the wider centennial commemorations. 
 
In 2012, Cameron announced a substantial programme of events and initiatives to be 
funded by money from the Treasury and partners such as the Heritage Lottery Fund. 
These included a £35m refurbishment of the WWI galleries at the Imperial War Museum 
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to be funded through the Libor fines; a series of national, high profile commemorative 
events marking the anniversaries of significant phases of the war, such as the Battle of the 
Somme in July 1916; a commitment of £5.3 million, jointly funded by the Department for 
Education and the Department for Communities and Local Government, to support pupils 
and teachers in English secondary schools to visit WW1 battlefields and take part in 
remembrance ceremonies in northern Europe; and at least £15m from the Heritage 
Lottery Fund, including a new £6m fund for community projects (Gov.uk 2012). There is 
no doubt that this last measure has encouraged several important projects that highlight 
the extent of colonial labour deployed in the course of the war, a topic that has long been 
played down in mainstream narratives of British military prowess (Siblon 2012). Before 
addressing the restoration of the Muslim Burial Ground Peace Garden in more detail, it is 
first necessary to look more closely at the contested politics of race and colonial war 
heritage which provides the context in which this particular heritage site has acquired 
such significance.  
 
Theatrics of blood 
This essay seeks to question the association between military service and as the 
cornerstone of citizenship and belonging in the 21st century. On the face of it, the 
restoration of the former graveyard is a prime example of a locally-based commemorative 
project that offers a stigmatized community the chance to feel included in the national 
effort to mark the centenary (see, for example, Lockley 2016). US anthropologist John 
Kelly wrote that ‘Stories of blood sacrifices for the nation can irrigate, ennoble and even 
sanctify the projects of many interested claimants’ (1995, p. 495). In his analysis of what 
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he calls the ‘theatrics of blood’ in a different geographical and historical context, he 
suggested that ‘Arguments about shed blood can be powerful tools for social movements 
out to make or unmake political limits’ (ibid). Military history – whether deeds of past 
glory or simply the re-iteration that ‘We Were There Too’ – acquires value as a resource 
for survivors and descendants, whether it is made to re-articulate group identities or 
provide the basis of assimilation and integration strategies (Krebs 2004). In the UK and 
elsewhere in Europe, a combination of factors has re-animated discussions about the 
significance of military service – and specifically death in uniform – for grounding 
citizenship claims for postcolonial migrants and their descendants (Qureshi 2013, Ware 
2010). Yet as Nirmal Puwar writes in an essay on the ‘Spatial Interruptions of War, 
Nation, and Memory’, while these kinds of gestures aspire to bring in those who have 
been hitherto excluded, ‘they are largely limited by the fact that the categories that 
pervade our existing notions of the nation and the national archives remain largely 
unquestioned’ (2011, pp. 329-330). She cautions that despite the widening of  ‘the 
national story’ entailed in these kinds of projects, ‘what continues… in our post-colonial 
times, is the performative centering of the national memory of war in royalist and 
militaristic forms of nationalism.’ (ibid).  
 
Using the Peace Garden as a barometer, this essay argues that it is important to challenge 
the dominant patriotic script, not least because it effectively obscures the details of 
European colonial rule that have shaped so much of contemporary social and geopolitical 
identities. Researching the background to the burial ground not only entails an 
investigation into the wider posthumous meanings attached to the deaths of black, Asian, 
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African, Chinese and ethnically marked groups while wearing British military uniform, 
whether they were buried with appropriate funeral rites or not, in the course of fighting 
for Britain. The decision to locate the burial ground in Woking also provides an 
opportunity to bring to public attention a relatively unknown chapter of the development 
of Islamic practices and institutions in Britain. In turn, this can provide a more complex 
geopolitical account of the role of Islam in European imperialist calculations, including 
the exploitation (by European powers) of Islamic concepts such as Jihad. In this instance, 
the burial ground was created as a direct consequence of German attempts to persuade 
Muslims throughout the British Empire to switch allegiance to the Ottoman caliphate. 
Historian David Olusoga (2014) has described the ‘choreography’ of the fatwa issued by 
the ruler of Ottoman Turkey in November 1914, which was ‘intended to legitimize the 
Jihad according to Koranic scripture’ (213). The fourth and final fatwa leading to the 
declaration of ‘holy war’ was directly addressed to Muslim soldiers who were fighting for 
the Allies.  
 
These soldiers ‘who in the present war are under England, France, Russia, 
Montenegro and those who give aid to these countries by waging war against 
Germany and Austria, allies of Turkey, do they deserve to be punished by the wrath 
of God as being the cause of harm and damage to the Caliphate and to Islam?’ The 
answer is ‘Yes’ (ibid). 
 
These details can be used productively to uncover and celebrate a richer, more nuanced 
history of Muslim life in Britain in the late 19th and early 20th century. Much of that 
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information, however, is readily available to whose who know where to look for it. In 
addition to the fictional account of the journey that hundreds of Indian sepoys made to 
the trenches in northern France, which is represented in riveting detail in Mulk Raj 
Anand’s novel Across the Black Waters (1939), the history of South Asian military labour 
employed in the British Expeditionary Force in Europe relies largely on the foundational 
work of scholars such as David Omissi (1998, 1999, 2007), Humayun Ansari (2004, 
2007) and Santanu Das (2013). But rather than focus on the experiences of Indian 
soldiers engaged in the process of combat, the restoration of the former graveyard 
demands an explanation of how a small proportion ended their lives in southern England 
and why their interment caused such controversy.  
 
A Sense of injustice 
In a fascinating article on Indian encounters with Europe, Omissi (2007) emphasises that 
many Indian soldiers came to Britain as a result of the outbreak of war in Europe in 1914. 
Drawing on the letters written by the soldiers to their families back in India, he pays 
particular attention to the faith-based rituals and restrictions that were a reminder of the 
expertise gained by British colonial authorities following the 1857 National Uprising. He 
notes, for example, that, 
 
 The authorities took particular care over religious provision in the various hospitals 
and convalescent homes, not least because they did not want letters home to cause 
religious anxiety in India. The Pavilion hospital had separate kitchens for Muslims, 
meat-eating Hindus and vegetarians; and both pork and beef were banned from the 
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premises (378).  
 
Despite this degree of sensitivity which replicated customs in the British Indian Army 
itself, anxieties about disrupting the racial order of the time meant that the Indian soldiers 
were separated from their white counterparts, kept them away from female nurses and 
banned, on pain of flogging, from strolling outside the grounds of their convalescence 
homes without an escort. As Omissi explains:  
 
The soldiers wrote about their situation, apparently without fear of the censorship, 
and several men compared their condition to being in ‘prison’. One Indian sub-
assistant surgeon took matters into his own hands and, as a protest, tried (and 
failed) to shoot the hospital commandant, Colonel Bruce Seton. For this act, he was 
sentenced to seven years’ rigorous imprisonment. Eventually, the rules about 
mixing with British civilians were relaxed, because of the resentment that they had 
caused, and those men well enough to do so were allowed to stroll about the town 
in pairs, for two and a half hours at a time, accompanied by a British soldier (380). 
 
The letters provide evidence that many were depressed: ‘A sense of injustice also 
informed the feeling, occasionally expressed after the Indians suffered heavy losses at the 
Second Battle of Ypres, that the sepoys were being sacrificed to spare the lives of British 
troops’ (381). However, despite the hundreds slaughtered in Europe, there seem to have 
been relatively few deaths among those who were given medical treatment in England. 
Those who died were accorded appropriate funeral and burial rites.  Between 1914-1918, 
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53 Hindus and Sikhs were cremated on a specially built funeral ghat on the South Downs, 
overlooking Brighton, and their ashes scattered in the sea. A chattri was built to 
commemorate the site. The first Indian soldier to die in England was Ahmed Khan, a 
Muslim who was buried in the Mohammedan Cemetery adjacent to the village of 
Brookwood, near Woking, in December 1914.  
 
The distinctive heathland found in that part of southern England was allocated for 
common use after being protected from enclosure since 1805. Recently designated as a 
Site of Special Scientific Interest (SSSI) because of its birdlife, the area, now called 
Horsell Common, bears testimony to the historical presence of Muslims in British social 
and cultural life, regardless of any military connection. The cemetery at Brookwood was 
known for its ‘ethnically and religiously pluralistic character’, partly because it contained 
the oldest Muslim burial ground in the country, dating back to the late nineteenth century 
(Ansari 2007, p. 559). In 1889 ex-colonial official called G. W. Leitner, who was 
previously the Registrar at the University of Punjab in Lahore, raised sufficient funds 
among Indian Muslims to establish an Oriental Institute in Woking which he intended to 
be a centre in Europe for the study of ‘Oriental languages, culture and history’ (Haq 
1930). He was also responsible for building a purpose-built mosque adjoining the centre, 
the first to be built in the UK. In 1913, by which time the mosque had fallen into 
disrepair, Khwaja Kamal-ud-Din, a lawyer who had traveled to Britain after pleading a 
court case with the Privy Council, and who was a dedicated member of the Ahmadiyya 
Movement
12, launched the Woking Mission ‘with the object of presenting the true picture 
of Islam and refuting the highly distorted image of Islam that was widely-prevalent in the 
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West at the time’ (Haq 1930).⁠ Meanwhile the plot in Brookwood cemetery which was 
originally allocated for use by members of this growing Muslim community, had grown 
into a recognised burial place which further marked this Surrey town as a centre for 
British and visiting Muslims (Ansari 2007, p, 559).  
 
The Woking Herald ran a report of Khan’s funeral which illustrates the role that local 
Muslims, led by Khwaja Kamal-ud-Din and others, played in mediating the details of 
custom and deference:  
 
The first burial in this country of an Indian soldier who has died as a result of 
wounds received while serving with the Indian Expeditionary Force at the front 
took place in the Mohammedan Cemetery at Brookwood on Monday afternoon. He 
was Ahmad Khan, of the 3rd Sappers & Miners, and he died on board a transport 
while on the way from France to Netley Hospital, on November 4. On Saturday the 
body was conveyed to the Woking Mosque in a motor hearse, the coffin being 
enshrouded in a Union Jack. The community of Muslims at the Mosque made 
arrangements with the Necropolis Company for the interment, which was not 
largely attended, chiefly on account of the fact not being generally known, but most 
of the Mohammedans at Woking were present, amongst them being an Arab from 
Medina, the burial place of the Prophet Mahomet. 
 
The report went on to describe how the burial was conducted according to appropriate 
ritual. Writing about the way in which burial has contributed to the establishment of a 
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Muslim presence in Britain over the past 200 years, historian Humayun Ansari cites a 
description of the burial of another Indian Muslim officer in 1915, taken from the Islamic 
Review (2007, p. 558): 
 
At the request of the imam of the Woking mosque, the local commanding officer 
detailed fifty soldiers, headed by an officer, to attend the funeral in order to pay 
military honours to this gallant soldier. Three rounds were discharged and, in a 
fusion of Muslim practices with British military traditions, the ‘Last Post’ was 
sounded by the bugle boys’. 
 
Despite this due attention to military protocol and the apparently diligent attention given 
to Moslem burial customs in Brookwood, the War Office became concerned about the 
possible impact of German propaganda. A report in the Woking Herald once again 
summed up the situation:   
 
…very grievous lies and false reports were being spread by the Germans amongst 
the Indian troops as to the manner in which we were dealing with the 
Mohammedan wounded and dead; it was of the utmost importance that the 
conscientious scruples of Indian troops should be carefully observed and every 
consideration given to them (Ansari 2007, p. 560). 
 
The British were aware of the fact that the Germans were distributing leaflets in the 
trenches, specifically aimed at Indian soldiers. These materials gave details of the fatwa 
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issued by the Ottoman Caliphate, urging Muslims that it was their sacred duty to change 
sides, an episode described in some detail in Anand’s novel (1939/2013). The charge that 
the British government was not burying Muslim soldiers with due respect was a powerful 
incentive for mutiny, as the War Office was well aware (Omissi 1998). In order to counter 
these allegations, it was therefore decided to commission a new burial ground specifically 
reserved for Muslim soldiers. An area was chosen near the Woking mosque along the 
bank of a canal on Horsell Common, some 500 yards away (Aziz 2014). Ansari writes 
that the chairman of the local urban council welcomed the Muslim cemetery, describing it 
as ‘an honour to have men who fell as a result of the war buried in the district’ (2007, p. 
561). An India Office surveyor and architect, T. H. Winney, designed the enclosure so 
that its arches, minarets and domed gateway reflected the traditional Indo-Arab 
architectural style of the Woking mosque, and the structure was built by a local firm. The 
burial ground was completed in 1917 and subsequently received the bodies of 19 Indian 
soldiers from the British Expeditionary Force who died between 1914-1918.  
 
Despite this dense chapter of social history merely sketched out here, the fate of the 
military cemetery in Woking was to be determined by lack of funds as much as by lack of 
interest. Initially, the newly formed Imperial War Graves Commission (IWGC) took 
responsibility for the maintenance of the cemetery in 1921 and by 1945 there was a total 
of 27 gravestones as eight more were added. The site then fell into disrepair, possibly due 
to the organisation’s policy of differentiating between the treatment of ‘white graves’ and 
those of ‘natives’ (Barrett 2007). In 1969 the graves were removed and the renamed 
Commonwealth War Graves Commission (CWGC) transferred the bodies to Brookwood 
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Cemetery which, as Ansari notes, ‘has continued to contribute, through the expression of 
the funerary rituals carried out there, to the construction of Muslim collective memory in 
a culturally pluralizing Britain’ (2007, p. 562). At this point, the ownership of the site 
reverted to the original landowner, the Horsell Common Preservation Society. Photos 
taken in the intervening period show the walls and gateway reclaimed by the ecology of 
the common, despite various attempts to raise money for their upkeep. In 1984, Historic 
England (HE) awarded the structure a Grade 2 listing due to its ‘unique and special 
interest in a national context’. The original entry noted its historical significance as a rare 
purpose-built structure for the Muslim community. Horsell Common Preservation Society 
was unable to raise funds to restore the site, even though HE carried out a review in 2010 
when they reaffirmed the architectural and cultural importance of the building. However, 
it was not until the prospect of the centenary of WW1 loomed on the horizon that HE had 
a change of heart. At this point they offered to fund 80% of the cost of repairs to the 
structure, and the Department for Communities and Local Government provided £50,000 
funding to Woking Borough Council to make up most of the remainder.⁠ Support was 
also provided by the Armed Forces Community Covenant Grants Scheme, Government 
of the Sultanate of Oman, Shah Jahan Mosque and Surrey County Council Community 
Improvements Fund. Where the militarization of multiculture, outlined earlier, helps to 
explain why this site acquired such value, it would be a mistake to overlook the role 
played by Muslims within the armed forces themselves. Here we examine the role of 
AFMA in mediating the ongoing crisis in military recruitment in the wider context of a 
counter-terrorism agenda aimed primarily at Muslim communities. 
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The British Muslim soldier 
It may seem obvious to restate the fact that war routinely fixes and reifies ethnic and 
national identities, or as historian Tarak Barkawi puts it, “war and representations of 
sacrifice in war are engines of reification’ (2004, p. 161). Whereas Barkawi was referring 
specifically to identities formed in the course of war fighting, militarized multiculture can 
also make ethnicity and religion meaningful in other military settings. The Armed Forces 
Muslim Association (AFMA) was founded in the context of the war in Afghanistan (Ware 
2013, pp. 132-5) and re-launched in the course of the garden’s restoration with an 
enhanced public profile. In 2015 the group won the Employee Network Public Sector 
Award ‘for the organisation with the best race or cultural diversity employee network 
group’ (MoD 2015). Its founding member and most energetic proponent, Imam Asim 
Hafiz, has provided a voice within the institution that is able to vocalize the needs and 
concern of some 400-500 Muslim personnel (Sengupta 2015) while at the same time 
advocating for the rights of UK-born Muslims to join the armed forces without prejudice 
(see, for example, the BBC Radio 4 documentary Salam to Queen and Country March 
2017). The AFMA twitter profile states that the organization supports their members to 
‘perform their military duties in full without compromising their faith,’ and is regularly 
updated as a recruitment tool aimed at young Muslims. The account repeatedly 
emphasizes that there are five MoD policies devised specifically to support Muslims, 
such as allowances for prayer time, halal food and performing the Hajj. It frequently 
mentions LCpl Jabron Hashmi, who died in action in Afghanistan in 2006, and whose 
memory was honoured at a special Iftar held at the defence headquarters in June 2016 to 
‘recognise 100 years of Muslim service’. Significantly, out of 375 tweets over a six 
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months period from October 2016 to April 2017, I noted that 23 per cent showcased 
Muslim soldiers, female and male, who were commemorated for their heroism in WW1 
and WW2. These tweets included many references to the renovation of the Muslim Burial 
Ground Peace Garden in Woking. As we have noted, Imam Asim was a prominent figure 
in all the ceremonies throughout the process as his institutional status made him well-
placed to negotiate between various government departments, military officials and 
members of local organisations who were publicly committed to the restoration. Although 
not a soldier himself, he has been notable for his insistence that Muslims are entitled to 
serve their country, defying the assumption that there is no place for Muslims in the 
British military.  
 
In addition to signalling AFMA’s intervention as a voice articulating a British Muslim 
military perspective, it is also necessary to look at the armed forces’ recruitment 
strategies. The 2010 defence review entailed an ambitious structuring of British Army 
over the next decade, beginning with a reduction in size from 102,000 to 82,000 regular 
soldiers and an increase in the number of reservists from 19,000 to 30,000. In another 
major change, recruitment was outsourced to Capita in March 2013. In July 2016, 
however, there were just 79,590 trained regular soldiers; the RAF and the navy were also 
reported to be short of their fully-trained strength as well. These figures were blamed on 
‘low unemployment, a lack of operations and stubbornly low morale after years of 
cutbacks’ (Farmer 2016). Behind this story of fluctuating recruitment, however, there is a 
longer narrative of the institution’s failure to attract minority ethnic applicants (Mason & 
Dandeker 2009). The impact of equality and diversity legislation since 2000, and the 
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pressure to recruit from BAME communities, has meant that the army, in particular, has 
been obliged to use outreach strategies which speak directly in terms of culture, faith and 
identity; young people are routinely approached through categories such as Muslim, 
Hindu or Sikh, mediated by gatekeepers in mosques, madrassas, temples and gurdwaras 
(Ware 2012). The AFMA twitter account indicates that there has been some success in 
building conversations in cities such as Bolton, Birmingham and Leicester, for example, 
with illustrations of seminars, visits and exercises taking place on Islamic premises. 
While there are no figures to indicate whether these dialogues have provided effective in 
increasing recruitment, the proof that they are taking place demonstrates that the security 
services are able to embrace the rubric of equality and diversity for their own strategic 
purposes. This comes across in media reports of these initiatives as being intrinsic to the 
counter-terrorism agenda.  
 
In early 2015, for example, the head of the Army, General Sir Nick Carter, announced a 
recruitment drive to attract more BAME candidates. He publicly stated: ‘Our recruitment 
from Black, Asian and Minority Ethnic Communities have been improving over the years, 
but it is nowhere near it needs to be, we have to do more’ (Sengupta 2015). Insisting that 
the organization was mostly concerned with the quality of the individual recruit, he 
reiterated the standard line that ‘The values and standards we espouse resonate closely 
with these communities and there is much common ground that we can build on to 
broaden our recruitment base’ (ibid). Despite the fact that the official press release did 
not mention any particular minority, the media instantly amplified the message with 
headlines claiming that the British Army was launching a drive to recruit more Muslims. 
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The report in the Independent spelled it out: ‘The British Army is making a determined 
push to recruit Muslims in an attempt to counter the rise in radicalisation which has seen 
hundreds of young men from this country join violent extremist groups like Isis and al-
Shabaab’ (Sengupta 2015). The Guardian reported that the army had been trying to 
engage with communities in places such as Bradford and Burnley, ‘where Muslims 
account for about 25% and 10% of the population respectively’ (MacAskill 2015) and 
that further recruiting drives were planned in those towns. The Mail reiterated the stock 
line that there were more Muslims leaving the country than there were in the forces: 
‘Army drive for more Muslims after Paris massacre and rise of Islamic State as it’s 
revealed just 480 are currently serving’ (Brown 2015). However, despite this lurid 
headline, the Mail also provided an indication that the recruitment drive was not all about 
numbers. Citing the MoD’s press release, the journalist included the statement that 
‘diversity in all its forms drives change and can be a key factor in organisational agility. 
This agility is key for an Army facing evolving and hybrid threats’ (Brown 2015). While 
this formulaic reference does not name the cultural attributes that are so valuable, it 
provides further evidence of the strategic value of diversity in a heavily militarised 
setting. It is worth noting, however, that no such claim about agility and the merits of 
diversity were made when a number of white servicemen were arrested for belonging to a 
banned neo-Nazi organization (Davey 2017; see also fn9).  
 
Conclusion 
This point returns us to the Muslim Burial Ground Peace Garden and its significance in 
promoting the type of counter-terrorist, counter-extremist message endorsed by Baroness 
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Warsi in 2013. In May 2016 the UK Defence Academy hosted a conference of 
International Military Religious Leaders. Delegates included Imams, chaplains and 
representatives from 16 countries, including, among others, Jordan, Bahrain, Saudi 
Arabia, Egypt, Pakistan, Malaysia, Brunei, Kenya and Bosnia, UK and Canada, who 
were invited to attend a commemorative event in the garden. Images were dutifully 
recorded on the AFMA twitter account, with text explaining that the conference was held 
to ‘foster dialogue to tackle extremism around the world’. One participant was 
photographed against the backdrop of the gathering, with the words: ‘I didn't think I 
would find such a place that shows the respect that Britain has for Muslims’. This note of 
appreciation, tinged with disbelief, can be used to draw together the themes of this essay.  
 
The restored memorial garden has furnished the British Army with a rich opportunity to 
acknowledge the contribution that Muslim soldiers have made throughout its military 
history. In doing so, it has created a resource that can be used to exploit those historical 
connections in ways that meet the demands of defence and security policy, from 
demonstrating a commitment to diversity inside the organization to conducting public 
diplomacy on a global scale. The enthusiastic participation of Muslim service personnel 
in the restoration project demonstrates that this is a strategy open to UK Muslims as well. 
In doing so, it offers proof that, in the current security climate, military service remains, 
for some, a viable footing for asserting claims to citizenship today, especially when 
embedded in a longer history, not just of colonial war but also the establishment of 
Muslim communities in the UK. However, despite the proliferation of centenary-based 
projects demonstrating the extensive participation of colonial troops in WW1, it remains 
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deeply problematic that minority groups, especially those of Muslim faith, should have to 
‘prove’ their right to belong by showing their readiness to die for their country. This essay 
has argued that the extraordinary story of the Woking site and its recent renovation can be 
made to reveal hidden facets of today’s militarized multiculture, while also offering 
suppressed historical evidence about the conditions under which Indian soldiers served in 
Britain’s colonial army, at what cost and with what consequences. Thus it can potentially 
create fresh opportunities to challenge dominant histories of empire and complacent 
accounts of its legacy today, thereby educating younger generations about the cultural 
heritage of war and contesting the role of military work as the touchstone for 
contemporary forms of belonging.  
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